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An ‘obligation’ to provide air travel:  
In the 
Covid-19 era 






This paper takes the reader on a circular journey. The setting is the European Union with the 
primary focus exploring the ‘vital’ need for transport and mobility, specifically the obligation 
to ensure the provision of air transport services.  
 
Historical contextualization is firstly provided, which reveals a background of State 
protectionism in the field of aviation, including the use of subsidies to national airlines.  The 
internal liberalization of the market through a series of packages is then considered. The key 
emphasis of this research is to investigate the Public Service Obligation (PSO) mechanism – 
which includes a case study as applied to cross border PSO use. 
 
The latter part of the paper discusses the Covid-19 pandemic – the consequences and 
implications to airlines, passengers and national governments are all discussed. This includes 
the restriction to individual movement and the impact to airline businesses. In this current 
environment and a post Covid-19 world, the research concludes that there will be an 
increased need to support airlines through bailouts and that there is a likelihood that more 
routes will necessitate the use of PSOs. However, there is recognition given to the fact that 
this potentially will risk a return to an anti-competitive environment and the liberalized 
internal market.     
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION: The right to travel 
 
Mobility enables social, cultural, political and economic activities to take place. Society relies 
on transport. As the United Nations acknowledged, ‘transport drives development, links 
people, connects local communities to the world, builds markets and facilitates trade.’1  It is 
key to our very survival. It is arguably a fundamental right to be able do so.2 
 
 
* Sarah Jane Fox is a professor and researcher. She currently works at the University of East London in the U.K. 
and is a member of a number of policing/law enforcement bodies within the U.K. and in the EU.  She is a 
registered international expert on aviation (and transport) across the globe, an adviser to the Malaysian Aviation 
Commission (MAVCOM), and a listed expert with the EU Parliament.  She is the co-director and founder of the 
Online Harms and Cyber Crime Unit (OHCCU) and the Deputy Director of the Institute of Connected 
Communities (ICC) – London, U.K.  Dr. Fox is also a Trustee on the Lloyd’s Tercentenary Research 
Foundation (LTRF) Board for Lloyd’s of London. She is also a visiting professor at DePaul University, 
Chicago. 
1 MOBILIZING for DEVELOPMENT:  Analysis and Policy Recommendations from the United Nations 
Secretary-General's High-Level Advisory Group on Sustainable Transport. New York City, October 2016. 
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/2375Mobilizing%20Sustainable%20Transport.pdf 
2 See linked discussions: Sarah Jane Fox (2017) “Mobility and Movement Are ‘Our’ Fundamental 
Rights”. . . Safety & Security – Risk, Choice & Conflict! Issues in Aviation Law and Policy. Volume 17 No. 1. 
Autumn, 2017, pp 7-43.  
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Transport modes have evolved and become more accessible to the global population. From a 
European perspective, the chapter on transport was a founding, cornerstone of the Treaty 
establishing the now European Union. As was more recently stated, mobility is vital to the ..... 
quality of life of citizens as they enjoy their freedom to travel....”3  
 
In recognition to this principle, in terms of the key enabler of transport to individuals and 
community lives and livelihoods, the European Union (EU) has enshrined the principle of a 
Public Service Obligation (PSOs) within legislation. PSOs are a mechanism used by 
governments in many countries, not just within Europe,4 to mandate a minimum level of 
commercial transportation service, especially for small or rural communities, where they may 
otherwise not be (commercially) viable. PSOs maybe applied to land, sea or air transport 
services. This particular research paper however is limited to the latter - air transport 
services.5 So as not to be abused and distort the market, PSOs are strictly overseen and in 
Europe, there are a number of provisions utilised to do so. Given this, there are limitations 
applied as to what qualifies as a PSO transport eligible route, accepting that many routes are 
highly competitive and, therefore, financially sustainable…….That is until 2020; a year of 
challenge to the whole world due to SARS-CoV-2 (herein - Covid-196).  The Covid-19 
pandemic continues to adversely affect the lives of so millions globally, turning ‘the world 
upside down.’7 The asset – transport, and the whole ethos (i.e. mobility) was challenged, not 
just in Europe but worldwide, due to this pandemic that affected and infected the globe. As a 
consequence, certainly in Europe, the ability to access transport, to even move, was greatly 
restricted, as, one-by-one, nations asserted various limitations that compromised the concept 
of free movement. From the perspective of aviation – the impact to this mode of transport has 
been disastrous, with it being described as the “deepest crisis ever in the history of aviation.”8  
 
The primary focus (of this research paper) is to review the importance of transport – 
specifically, the use of aviation (air transport) within the EU. As part of this, discussion is 
given to the ‘vital’ need for transport and mobility, and, therefore, the concept of the ‘right of 
movement.’ This includes, in particular, considering what is an ‘acceptable level of air 
services’9 and the key means to ensure that there is accessibility (by/to air transport) and 
hence equity to EU citizens, particularly, through the utilization of PSOs.  
 
Viewed another way, the research considers the obligation to ensure air service provisions.  
 
In the latter part of the paper, discussion is given to Covid-19 and the implications in terms of 
this pandemic that is causing worldwide pandemonia – with specific focus predominantly on 




3 Emphasis added. COM (2011) 144 (final) ‘Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area – Towards a 
competitive and resource efficient transport system.’ Brussels, 28.3.2011.  
4 Examples include the United States and Australia.  For a discussion and comparison of PSO schemes in the 
European Union, United States (Essential Air Service (EAS)), and Australia (Regional Aviation Access 
Programme (RAAP)), see Martin Hromádka, Definition of Public Service Obligation Potential in the New EU 
Member States, 12 Transp. Probs. 5 (2017). 
5 Noting that, where applicable, reference is also made to other transport PSOs that serve to provide clarity, an 
illustrative example/added dimension. 
6 Technically SARS-CoV-2 causes the COVID-19 disease. 
7 https://unstats.un.org/unsd/ccsa/documents/covid19-report-ccsa.pdf 
8 https://unstats.un.org/unsd/ccsa/documents/covid19-report-ccsa.pdf 
9 See discussions within section 3.2 of this paper. 
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1.1. Research Design: setting the scene 
 
This paper takes the reader on a circular journey…… (Diagram 1). 
 
 




Firstly, the scene is set in terms of providing contextualization as to the European Union and 
integration intentions of providing a united European Community with ease of access and 
increased opportunities for EU citizens (and businesses). As part of this, the importance of 
transport is discussed, before turning to aviation and identifying the progressive measures 
taken from the mid-1980’s to drive forward the principle of one internal EU (free) market. 
 
Directed discussion is then given to the aspect of PSOs with specific case studies relating to 
cross border PSOs and the compatibility (conflict) with State aid/assistance. 
 
In the last section the implications of Covid-19 are considered (to general movement and 
chiefly to aviation) before returning to consider PSO and the future of aviation within the EU. 
 
 
2. EU – a united Europe  
 
Barnard states, 
“the driving force behind the European Union.... [was] the consolidation of a post-
war system of inter-state co-operation and integration that would make pan-
European armed conflicts inconceivable.” 10 
 
The primary purpose of the Treaty Establishing the European Community11 was to bring 
about the gradual integration of the States of Europe and to establish a common market 
founded on the four freedoms of movement (for goods, services, people, and capital) and on 
 
10 Catherine Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU – The Four Freedoms. (Oxford University Press, 2004).  
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the gradual approximation of economic policies. Whilst the principle respects the 
individualism of the nations, it is based upon removing boundaries (and even borders).  
 
The objective behind a single European market was always to unify and simplify rules, thus 
enabling EU citizens to be able to make the most of the opportunities offered to them by 
having direct access to the now 27 Member States that form todays, European Union.12   
Essential to this is ‘transport’ which has always played a key part in realizing this goal.  
Ultimately, “there can be no market without transport!”13  And, consequently, without an 
efficient and effective transport policy, the Internal Market could not have been achieved. 
 
 
2.1. The EU Transport Chapter  
 
Since the Treaty of Rome (1957) the transport chapter has remained virtually unchanged by 
subsequent Treaty revisions.  The current, Treaty of Lisbon,14 specifically, the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), contains only a few minor amendments from 
that of the original wording.  
 
While Article 91 TFEU re-emphasizes the “distinctive features of transport,” Article 100 
TFEU, of the Transport Title, emphasizes that it “shall apply to transport by rail, road and 
inland waterways.” Therefore, there are some distinct differences in terms of both air and sea 
modes, as, the “European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the 
ordinary legislative procedure, may lay down appropriate provisions for sea and air 
transport.”   
 
2.1.1. Historic Challenges – effects to aviation 
The internal dimension 
 
During the first 30 years, of the, then, European Community, the transport policy15 remained 
largely within the control of the individual governments, although technically this should not 
have been the case. In many ways it was a retained legacy, that saw a protectionism approach 
being applied.16  
 
As a consequence of the lack of joint action, aviation remained subject to individual Member 
States regulating their own domestic aviation policy.  Subsidies by each country to its State 
flag carrier were also commonplace, which inevitably went against the policy direction for 
 
12 As will be referred to later, as of the 23:00 GMT on January 31, 2020 UK stopped being a member of the 
European Union.  Currently it is the transition period which is due to end on December 31, 2020. 
13 EUROPEAN COMM’N, ROAD TRANSPORT, EUROPE ON THE MOVE 1 (2004) (emphasis added). 
14 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European 
Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007 OJ C 306, December 17, 2007 (signed on 13 December 2007, 
which entered into force on 1 December 2009).  
The Treaty of Lisbon amended the EU's two core treaties, the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 
establishing the European Community. The latter was renamed the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union. In addition, several Protocols and Declarations are attached to the Treaty. 
15 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, arts. 90–100, OJ C 202, June, 
7 2016 (C 326) 47, 85 (Ex. EC Treaty arts. 70–80). 
16 Discussed within; Sarah Jane Fox, (2016) ‘Aviation: a risky business: green and level playing fields? A 
paradox of virtues ‘dumping’ – anti-competitiveness!’, Int. J. Public Law and Policy, Vol. 5, No. 4, pp.333–
367.  
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one internal, single market, allowing equal access and competition. Two consequences of this 
was higher fares, as well as market distortion.17   
In essence, the European Community had been either unwilling or unable to implement the 
Common Transport Policy (CTP) as stipulated within the Treaty of Rome.18  Hence, during 
this period, liberalization was slow and inconsistencies across the EU inevitably remained.  It 
eventually took the intervention of the Court of Justice,19 (now, referred to as the CJEU) in 
1985, for progress to be made. Up until the mid-1980s/early 1990s, intra-EU aviation was not 
under the control of a single agency, as had been the case across the states within the U.S.; 
whereby, this had subsequently led to a more united and consistent approach. 
The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) recognized, in the 198520 landmark case, 
that there was not a coherent set of rules and that, with regard to certain aspects of the 
transport policy, the Council had failed to fulfill its obligations.21  This resulted, within a 
month, to a program of legislative measures, the objective being to achieve an internal market 
by the end of 1992.22 
 
The EU, (similar to the U.S. initiative of deregulation23) thereafter began to adopt a series of 
packages to liberalize the EU internally (Table 1:  Summary of EU Deregulation Packages).  
This was also arguably influenced by consumer demands, given that global communications 
which had enabled European customers to witness the benefits of liberalization in the U.S. air 
transport market. 
Consequently, this led to more willingness by the Member States to embrace the concept of a 
more open environment within a democratic European Union.  
First Package: (adopted in December 
1987)  
- Council Regulation 3975/87 on 
the Application of the 
Competition Rules to Air 
Transport 
- Council Regulation 3976/87 on 
the Application of the Treaty to 
certain categories of agreements 
and concerted parties 
- Council Directive 601/87 on Air 
Fares 
Summarized: 
This introduced the relaxation of 
established rules – for intra-EU traffic, 
limiting government rights re opposing 
new fares.  It extended flexibility to 
airlines re seat capacity-sharing. 
 
17 Id. 
18 European Transport Policy for 2010:  Time to Decide, COM (2001) 370 final (Sept. 12, 2001).  Policy 
guidelines of the White Paper, at 6. 
19 Case 13/83, Parliament v. Council, 1985 E.C.R. 1513, 46–50. 
20 Id. 
21 Id.  (“[T]hat in breach of the Treaty the Council has failed to ensure freedom to provide services in the sphere 
of international transport and to lay down the conditions under which non-resident carriers may operate 
transport services in a Member State” (as stated in relation to road transport).).  The Treaty of Maastricht later 
reinforced this principle.  Treaty on European Union, July 29, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1. 
22 Completing the Internal Market:  White Paper from the Commission to the European Council, COM (1985) 
310 final (June 28–29, 1985). 
23 Airline Deregulation Act, 1978.  Public Law 95–504, Oct. 24, 1978, 92 Stat. 1705.  
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- Council Decision 602/87 on 
capacity-sharing and market 
access 
Second Package: (adopted in July1990) 
- Council Regulation 2343/90 on 
market access 
- Council Regulation 2342/90 on 
air fares 
- Council Regulation 2344/90 on 
the application of the Treaty to 
certain categories of agreement 
and concerted parties 
Summarized:  
This extended market access, providing 
greater flexibility over fare-setting and 
capacity-sharing. This led to the concept 
of “Community (EU) Carriers” being 
developed and having the right to carry 
unlimited cargo and passengers between 
their home State and other EU countries.  
Third Package: (adopted July 1992) 
- Council Regulation 2407/92 on 
licensing of air carriers 
- Council Regulation 2408/92 on 
market access 
- Council Regulation 2409/92 on 
fares and rates 
Summarized:  
This introduced the freedom to provide 
services within the EU and in 1997 the 
freedom to provide “cabotage,” the right 
of an airline of one Member State to 
operate routes within another Member 
State.  
Further reforms re: Public Service 
Obligation: on routes, regarded as 
essential for regional development. 
 
Table 1 – Summary of EU Deregulation Packages 
(Source: Author) 
The Third Package24 remained applicable for 15 years, being replaced by Regulation 
1008/2008 on common rules for the operation of air services in the Community (the Air 
Services Regulation).25   
The Air Services Regulation (ASR) added further simplicity and internal liberalization by 
setting out rules on: 
• Market access; 
• Public Service Obligations; 
• The granting of and oversight of operating licenses for Community (EU) Carriers; 
• Aircraft registration and leasing; 
• Pricing; and 
• Traffic distribution between airports. 
 
24 Replacing Regulations 2407/92, 2408/92, 2409/92 as of Nov. 1, 2008. 
25 Council Regulation 1008/2008, Common Rules for the Operation of Air Services in the Community. OJ L 
293, October 31, 2008, p. 3–20. To be discussed at 3.2. 
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While, in the last 35 years, the number of Member States has increased, there has been 
increased unity and readiness to embrace the concept of a borderless internal Europe and, 
arguably, this had resulted in less national protection – including across the field of aviation. 
The ASR remains in force today and hence is relevant to the primary focus of this paper, 
namely the obligation to provide air transport provisions, Public Service Obligations (PSOs). 
This said, at times, the identification of routes to which a PSO has been applied is not without 
challenges in terms of meeting the requirements for such and, hence, not infringing any State 
Aid and competition elements. 
 
3. THE LISBON TREATY  
 
In today’s Lisbon Treaty, Article 4 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU) refers to shared competences between the Union and the Member States and 
included amongst these are areas relating to:  
i. the internal market; 
ii. social policy, for the aspects defined in this Treaty;  
iii. economic, social, and territorial cohesion; 
iv. environment; 
v. consumer protection; 
vi. Transport;26 
vii. trans-European networks;  
 
As can be seen, transport is a specific identified area but invariably also overlaps with many 
other identified areas listed (including other areas too – such as, energy, and justice, security 
and freedom).  
 
Article 3 TFEU stipulates the area of exclusive competency, which includes the area of 
competition rules for the functioning of a (fair and equal) internal market. 
  
 
3.1. Defining: Public Service Obligations 
 
The EU (European Commission’s Directorate General Mobility and Transport27) identifies 
that the main objectives of the European public transport policy are to provide safe, efficient 
and high-quality passenger transport services through ‘regulated competition.’ However, as 
part of this, it also takes into account social, environmental and regional development factors 
so as to “guarantee…. transparency and performance.”28  
 
In explaining what PSOs are, it is stated that; 
“Many public passenger transport services that society needs as part of its general 
interest cannot be run commercially, so the relevant national, regional or local EU 
authorities must be able to make certain they are provided.” 29 
 
 
26 Emphasis added (Title VI – Transport) 
27 Often referred to as DG Move 
28 https://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/pso_en 
29 Id. 
JOURNAL: Issues in Aviation Law and Policy 
Accepted: August 2020 
 8 
‘Services of general (economic) interest’ (SGEI) is a phrase frequently found in connection 
with PSOs and specifically, Article 14 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU) and Protocol No 26 on services of general interest annexed to the TFEU, sets 
out the general principles of how Member States both define and provide services of general 
economic interest. 
 
It is said that there are several ways for these to be recognized: 
(i) “by awarding exclusive rights to those running public services, compensating them 
financially, and also 
(ii) by defining rules for how public transport is operated.”30 
 
The European Union has developed legislation to avoid disparities between Member States in 
the procedures and conditions they apply to the execution of public service obligations. And 
in this regard, it should be observed that there is a fine line between providing a service under 
the requirements of a PSO and the infringement (or potential breach) of State aid subsidies. 
 
CJEU rulings have also added clarity in terms of when public service compensation does not 
constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 107 of the Treaty. In its judgment in the 
Altmark case,31 the Court of Justice provided that four cumulative criteria need to be met in 
this respect: 
 
- First, the recipient undertaking must actually have public service obligations to 
discharge, and the obligations must be clearly defined.  
- Second, the parameters on the basis of which the compensation is calculated must be 
established in advance in an objective and transparent manner.  
- Third, the compensation must not exceed what is necessary to cover all or part of the 
costs incurred in the discharge of the public service obligations, taking into account 
the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit.  
- Finally, where the undertaking that is to discharge public service obligations, in a 
specific case, is not chosen pursuant to a public procurement procedure which would 
allow for the selection of the tenderer capable of providing those services at the least 
cost to the community, the level of compensation needed must be determined on the 
basis of an analysis of the costs that a typical undertaking, well-run and adequately 
provided with the relevant means, would have incurred.32  
 
If these criteria are not met (and therefore, the general conditions for the applicability of 
Article 107(1) of the Treaty are realized) public service compensation constitutes State aid 
and is subject to Articles 93, 106, 107 and 108 of the Treaty.33  
 
Article 106(2) (TFEU), reinforces that providers of services that are of general economic 
interest are subject to the rules of the Treaties, in particular to the rules governing 
 
30 Id. 
31 Case C-280/00 Altmark Trans and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg v Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark 
[2003] ECR I-7747.  
32 2012/21/EU: Commission Decision of 20 December 2011 on the application of Article 106(2) of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union to State aid in the form of public service compensation granted to 
certain undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest (notified under 
document C(2011) 9380). OJ L 7, 11 Jan 2012, p. 3–10. 
33 In particular Articles: 107-109 TFEU relate to State aid, and the State aid rules, both substantive and 
procedural, remain applicable to the PSO routes. The PSO procedure under the Regulation does not substitute a 
State aid procedure. 
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competition. However, it should be identified that within the Treaty (and respective 
legislation) there are minor differences between the different transport types, which is 
particular so in respect to competition, this takes into account the specific features of each 
transport mode, including its operational characteristics. Hence, Article 106 does not apply 
when compensation is paid for public service obligations in respect to land transport.34 
 
Therefore, different rules apply to public service compensation in respect to air and maritime 
operations.  The Air Service Regulation (ASR) Regulation (EC) 1008/2008 applies common 
rules for the operation of air services in the Community.35  
 
3.2. Regulation (EC) 1008/2008 (ASR36)   
 
The PSO mechanism (within the ASR) recognizes the need to “ensure access to isolated or 
developing regions when a Member State finds that objectives of regional development policy 
will not be met adequately if only left to a free play of market forces as the market itself will 
not deliver an acceptable level of air services to these regions.”37  
 
Thus, PSOs are therefore an exception to the general principle of the freedom to provide air 
services within the EU, as guaranteed under Article 15(1) of the same Regulation.  
 
Articles 16-18 of the ASR relate to the general principles for PSOs.  
Article 16 details the stages that a Member State (MS) must first take (Figure 1). 
 
 
Therefore, the Member State firstly needs to inform the Commission, and, before entering 
into consultation with other Member States, the airports concerned and air carriers operating 
 
34 Instead, this type of compensation is covered by Article 93 TFEU as a 'lex specialist' and is applied according 
to the rules of Regulation 1370/2007 relating to (public) passenger transport services by rail and by road. 
35 Regulation (EEC) No 3577/92 applies the principle of freedom to provide services to maritime transport 
within Member States (maritime cabotage). 
36 Note there have been several amendments made to the original version: 
1. Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2018 
2. Regulation (EU) 2019/2 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018  
3. Regulation (EU) 2020/696 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 2020  
37 Commission Information Notice: INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, 
OFFICES AND AGENCIES: Interpretative guidelines on Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council — Public Service Obligations (PSO). June 17, 2017 O.J. C 194/01.  
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on the proposed route. After this the Member State may impose a public service obligation in 
respect of  
“scheduled air services between an airport in the Community and an airport serving 
a peripheral or development region in its territory or on a thin route to any airport on 
its territory any such route being considered vital for the economic and social 
development of the region which the airport serves”(Article 16.1). 
Definitions:38 
(i) A peripheral region is typically recognized to be ‘a remote region or a region 
accessible with difficulty from the capital and other main cities in the Member 
State.’ 
The remoteness and isolation should be considered with regard to the territory 
of the Member State, its ‘administrative, business, education and medical 
centres’ and also with regard to the territory and such as within other Member 
States to which it shares a border.  
(ii) A development region is ‘lagging behind economically,’ as measured, for 
example by GDP per capita or by the unemployment rate.  
 
(iii) A thin route – as the Commission makes reference to, the Regulation fails to 
provide a defined ‘quantified criterion’ to assess this. 
 
The Commission identifies that there is no one size fits all and that various 
situations may prevail in different Member States. However, it is reasoned, 
“based on the Commission's experience in a large number of PSO cases, it 
appears safe to say that a route with traffic of more than 100 000 passengers 
per year cannot normally be considered as a thin route within the meaning of 
the Regulation.”  
The Commission then publishes an information notice, relating to the PSO, in the Official 
Journal (O.J.) of the European Union. This notice identifying the two airports connected by 
the route concerned and possible intermediate stop-over point(s);  
It mentions the date of entry into force of the public service obligation; and indicates the 
complete address where the text and any relevant information and/or documentation related 
to the public service obligation ‘shall be made available without delay and free of charge by 
the Member State concerned’ (Article 16.4).  
It is stipulated that the PSO shall only be imposed to the extent necessary to ensure, on that 
specific identified route, the minimum provisions which air carriers would not assume if they 
were solely considering their commercial interest. These scheduled air services provided 
need to satisfy: 
i) fixed standards of continuity,  
ii) regularity,  
 
38 As explained within the Interpretative Guidelines (Id). 
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iii) pricing or minimum capacity. 
And, the fixed standards imposed on the route must also be set in a transparent and non-
discriminatory way.  
In respect to the frequency of the service – it is stated, that this must be uninterrupted with at 
least two daily frequencies. However, when this cannot be satisfied there is a requirement 
that the Community air carrier gives a guarantee that it will operate the route for a certain 
period, to be specified, in accordance with the other terms of the public service obligation. 
Both the necessity and adequacy of the PSO shall be assessed with regard to the following by 
the Member State (as per Article 16.3): 
(a)  the proportionality between the envisaged obligation and the economic 
development needs of the region concerned;  
(b)  the possibility of having recourse to other modes of transport (with the ability of 
such modes to meet the transport needs under consideration, in particular when 
existing rail services serve the envisaged route with a travel time of less than three 
hours and with sufficient frequencies, connections and suitable timings);  
(c)  the air fares and conditions which can be quoted to users;  
(d)  the combined effect of all air carriers operating or intending to operate on the 
route.  
Article 17 goes onto detail the tender process and details the requirement in terms of 
compensation made to an air carrier (imposed under Article 16). It is stated that such 
compensation ‘may not exceed the amount required to cover the net costs incurred in 
discharging each public service obligation, taking account of revenue relating thereto kept by 
the air carrier and a reasonable profit’ (Article 17.8). The tender process invites operators 
from other Member States (MS’s) to bid for the respective PSO contract, in compliance with 
the concept of being European airlines (and a united but competitive and open union). 
Article 18 (entitled examination of public service obligations) really concerns the oversight 
mechanism of PSOs so as to confirm compliance with the requirements for a PSO; and, 
therefore, to ensure that there is no infringement of Community law or national rules 
implementing Community law. This may be at the request of another Member State or 
through the Commissions own initiative. In response, and within two months, the Member 
State must:  
(a) supply a document justifying the need for the public service obligation and its 
compliance with the criteria mentioned in Article 16; plus, several analytical 
documents, namely: 
(b) ‘an analysis of the economy of the region;  
(c) an analysis of the proportionality between the envisaged obligations and the 
economic development objectives;  
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(d) an analysis of the existing air services, if any, and of the other modes of transport 
available which could be considered a substitute for the envisaged imposition.’  
3.2.1. Case Studies: PSOs across borders 
As of 18 September 2019, there were 176 recognised PSO routes across the EU39 (see Table 
2).  This is a small decrease of the 179 previously recorded.40 Comments will therefore be 
made on this latest data as below, accepting that there are likely to have been some minor 
changes since this date. 
MS 
Code41 
HR CY CZ EE FI FR EL IE IT LT PT ES SE UK42 
No. 10 1 3 3 3 37 28 3 11 1 20 23 11 22 
 
Table 2: Member States listed with PSOs (as of 18 September 2019) 
(Source: Authors43) 
As can be seen in Table 2, not all then 28 Member States have PSOs; and, in fact, this was 
shown to be limited to just half of the (then) EU States. The ones listed are notably those with 
coast lines and/or have remote (normally island) communities/territories; or, are themselves 
Islands (for example Cyprus, Eire (southern Ireland) and technically the UK – which has a 
number of peripheral islands – including Northern Ireland44).  So, from this perspective, it 
would be logical and predictable to see most of these States being identified. Likewise, given 
this, it is not suprizing to note that most PSOs are operated by national airlines (rather than an 
airline from another Member State). 
While the vast majority of PSOs are operated within the same Member State, there are also a 
number that link Member States to other Member States – that is are cross-border. 
There are a few that are particularly worthy of comment: 
 
39 Taken from the DG Move database. 
40 Commission Information Notice: INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, 
OFFICES AND AGENCIES: Interpretative guidelines on Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council — Public Service Obligations (PSO). June 17, 2017 O.J. C 194/01. 
41 The two-letter ISO code is used (ISO 3166 alpha-2) except for Greece for which the abbreviations EL has to 
be used. For details of the MS as expressed by the abbreviation see: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Tutorial:Country_codes_and_protocol_order#Codes.2C_names_and_protocol_order_of_E
uropean_Union_.28EU.29_Member_States 
42 Noting as of the 23:00 GMT on January 31, 2020 UK stopped being a member of the European Union. 
43 Based on data from Taken from the DG Move database. 
44 NOTE: these are not the focus of this paper – whereby the case study relates to the more unusual example of 
PSOs which go across-borders (from one Member State into another). 
The following however serves an illustrative example of such:  
- There are also many smaller islands off the UK mainland – e.g. around Scotland for example, the 
Western Isles, the Hebrides the Northern Islands, etc. 
- Spain and Italy, while forming part of the mainland of Europe both have communities located on island 
archipelagos (Spain – has the Canary Islands and Balearic Islands; and Italy has not only Sardinia and 
Sicily, etc., but a number of much smaller islands too, as does Greece). 
- Other remote regions which are served by PSOs tend to be located on peripheral areas – such as in the 
UK – e.g. 
– Cornwall (the most westerly point) of England which operates a PSO into London Heathrow. 
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1) Cyprus (CY) for example, has only one PSO and this is to another Member State – 
Belgium flying into Brussels.45 This would no doubt generate limited but essential 
travel to what is the de facto capital of the EU, as it hosts a number of principal EU 
institutions.46  
 
Data/observations on this PSO route: 
- This route was shown to be operated by Ryanair (with its registered operating office 
being in Eire); and, this is listed as a peripheral and thin route47 (Article 16.1). The 
route is operated across the 12 months but with a (minimum of) twice-weekly (return) 
service. The minimum annual number of seats per annum is identified as 20,800; 
however, in 2018 it is identified that 34,446 were achieved, with 37,044 being 
offered. This means that 2,598 seats went unoccupied, but the number realised 
exceeded the minimum by 13,646 – thus having a load factor (pax/actual seat %) of 
93%. The maximum fare is furthermore identified as €275, while there is no 
preferential (discounted) fare available for residents.  What is not identified is whether 
the maximum cost takes into account the ‘add-on’s’ that Ryanair, in particular are 
noted for, which would no doubt increase the profitability of this route to the operator. 
This is, however, an open route, meaning that is it not just restricted to one operator 
(noting that the majority of the PSOs operate under a restriction – that is, to one 
operator, in most cases due to the lower-end viability of running the service).  It is 
identified that there is no compensation (per pax) payable, in 2018, for this route and 
there would be no direct alternative service by another mode – given the Cyprus is an 
island lying to the far east in the EU south of Turkey closer to the area of Syria and 
Lebanon. 
 
2) Czech Republic (CZ) routes all are identified as going to cities outside of the Member 
State, although data for these routes is more limited due to the fact that these are 
newer routes (which were under tender as of the period when the data was supplied). 
The destinations shown were to Germany (Munich) and to Austria (Vienna) for what 
was identified as ‘development and thin routes.’ 
 
3) France (FR) is the only Member State which operates (and identifies) over 30 routes. 
The vast majority of which are utilized to link its own (French) regions and territories.  
This said, there are several that are perhaps somewhat suprizing flying out of 
Strasbourg – comment will be made on two48:  
(i) Strasbourg to Amsterdam (Netherlands) 
(ii) Strasbourg to Munich (Germany) 
 
Strasbourg is also a key city and centre for the European Union, arguable it is one of 
the main cities (alongside Brussels and Luxembourg). The European Parliament 
meets there, across the year, and there are other significant EU organizations there as 
well – such as the Council of Europe (and European Court of Human Rights). 
 
45 The capital of Belgium. 
46 This includes the administrative (legislative), executive (political) and legislative branches (although the 
judicial branch is located in Luxembourg and noting that the European Parliament also gathers in Strasbourg.  
47 Thinner markets are characterized by a lower demand for air travel and, as a consequence, airlines schedule 
fewer flights.  
48 There is also a PSO to Madrid – however, comment will not be made on this route, only to say this it is 
operated by Air Nostrum, which operates as a franchisee of Iberia (a Spanish airline). 
A further one is identified Strasbourg to Prague (the capital of the Czech Republic) – noting this was ceased as 
of April 8, 2019. 
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Noting: Article 16(1) requires that PSO route should always to be defined from one 
airport to another, and not with reference to two cities or regions. This said, the way 
that the PSO is listed on the database tends to refer more specifically to the cities. The 
selection of the airport for the purpose of a PSO should also be properly rationalized, 
while onward connectivity – i.e. the destinations and frequencies offered by the 
airports of the destination city – is however another element in this assessment, it 
cannot be the only justification for the choice of a specific airport over another.  
 
Data/observations on routes (i) and (ii) 
(i) Strasbourg to Amsterdam is approximately 603 km by road49 (circa 374 miles). 
This would equate to approximately – 5 hours 45 minutes. The route is also accessible 
by train and takes between 7 to just over 9 hours, costing approximately €50 (on 
average).  There is also a bus service which is shown to take between 10-15 hours and 
the cost is identified as anywhere from €24 upwards with an average of €46.  
- Flights are shown to be direct and operated by Air France (a national French airline 
– although, technically, merged with KLM – a Dutch airline) which is the airline 
awarded this specific and restricted – PSO (whereby, there is a restriction put on this 
service - in terms of one operator). The direct flight time is just over the hour (1 hour 
10 mins on average being shown).50 
 - Under the PSO data: this route is identified as a ‘thin route.’  
This is significant, as it has been identified that the lack of competition is especially 
relevant on thin routes where alternative transportation modes (i.e., bus, train or car) 
cannot offer an alternative efficient service. However, it is highly questionable 
whether this is the case noting that there are three alternative modes (train, bus and 
car). 
 
While, Bilotkach et al.,51 identify that intermodal competition is only relevant in 
Europe on routes that are shorter than 400 miles. This route lies just short of this 
distance – however, it should not be ignored as to the fact that this sees two key 
significant cities in the region being linked by an airline that has key links to both 
Member States, which potential is also essential to bear in mind and may cast doubt 
on a one size fits all approach in terms of referring to a specified distance (and 
providing a guise to hide subsidies under the premise of a PSO). 
 
The duration of the current PSO on this route is shown as being from April 9, 2019 to 
April 8, 2022; to be operated across the 12-months with a (return) frequency of 
between 5-10 flights per week. Under this PSO, the minimum number of seats per 
annum, required is 44,100. However, data shows that in 2018 the actual number of 
seats offered was 123,039 with 90,378 PSO seats being occupied. Hence, 32,661 seats 
were not occupied but the number realised exceeded the minimum by 46,278 – thus 
having a load factor (pax/actual seat %) of 204.94%. This also means that it sits just 
outside the 100,000 passengers being carried per year – which the Commission 
identifies as a potential rationale for defining a thin route (as above); however, it 
 
49 Via the A61 – which is said to be the fastest route as of this research (July 2020). 
https://www.google.com/maps Strasbourg,+France/Amsterdam,+Netherlands 
50 Alterative travel data being sourced by the author through general internet searches. 
51 Bilotkach, V., Fageda, X., Flores-Fillol, R., 2010, ‘Scheduled service versus personal transportation: the role 
of distance.’ Regional Science and Urban Economics, 40, pp. 60-72  
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should be noted that there are other reasonably easy options (other transport modes) 
that can also be utilized; and, as the Commission also identifies this threshold,  
‘does not imply, however, that any route with a traffic less than 100, 000 passengers 
per year is necessarily a thin route. Generally speaking, the higher the number of 
passengers on a particular route the more difficult it becomes to argue that such 
route would be eligible for a PSO, i.e. that without a PSO no carrier would assume 
certain standards as referred to in Article 16(1) solely considering its commercial 
interest.’52  
 
There was also compensation payable, per passenger (pax) in 2018 at €22.07 and the 
amount of annual compensation paid therefore is shown to be €1.994.666,67.53 It 
should be identified that there was no maximum fare specified.   
 
Looking on web searches across the month of September (2020) the cost of a return 
flight seemed to be on average in the area of €130 rising to upward of €220 for flights 
on Air France (or a subsidiary of Air France – Hop!54). 
 
(ii) Strasbourg to Munich: The shortest road journey is identified as approximately 
370 km by road55 (equating to roughly, 230 miles); and, by car, this would take 
approximately 3 hours and 40 min. In other words, depending upon where you lived, 
the proximity to the airport, and the time needed to park, clear security etc., this would 
invariably be seen as the quickest mode to use to travel from Strasbourg to Munich.  
As, according to Rail Europe: ‘Fast trains from Strasbourg to Munich take around 3 
hours and 43 minutes, covering a distance of approximately 287 kilometres.’56 It is 
identified that there are frequent services on this route too, with prices shown as 
varying between €27.63-€78.57  
Yet, this route does operate a PSO for what is deemed another ‘thin route.’ 
It was identified as a ‘new route’ with the PSO running, as before, from April 9, 2019 
to April 8, 2022.  
It is operated by the German airline, Lufthansa, on what is described as a restricted 
route that covers all 12-months with a return (minimum) frequency of 5 times per 
week. The minimum number of seats required under the PSO, per annuum, is 20,700. 
While saying this is a new route, it is however, identified that in 2018, 46,800 seats 
were offered on this PSO route and that there was compensation is the same year 
amounting to €1,132.666,67.58  
No minimum fare is specified. 
 
 
52 Footnote 18 of the Interpretive Commission document: 
Commission Information Notice: INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, 
OFFICES AND AGENCIES: Interpretative guidelines on Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council — Public Service Obligations (PSO). June 17, 2017 O.J. C 194/01 
53 The note added against this identifying that this relates to an average for 3 years 2019-2022.  
54 https://www.airfranceklm.com/en/hop 
55 Google Maps identifies 367.7 km - via the A81 and A8 which equates to 4 h 8 min. 




58 As above: The note added against this identifying this compensation relates to an average for 3 years 2019-
2022. 
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As Bråthen and Erikeson identified, Member States have a high level of flexibility in terms of 
deciding which routes are ultimately, ‘essential air services’ and whether the route should be 
‘deemed vital for the economic and social development of the region’ (served by the airport 
identified59). This includes starting with whether the Central Government or the Regional 
Governments should have responsibility for the PSO tender process.60  
 
It should be noted, that the vast majority of PSOs result in subsidized services paid by the 
public authorities. According to the Commission, the amount of subsidies spent yearly to 
operate them is estimated to be at least EUR 300 million (based on the information at the 
disposal of the Commission61). The Commission has reinforced that PSOs need to respect the 
‘principles of transparency, non-discrimination and proportionality’ stressing that they 
‘cannot introduce any discrimination based on the nationality or the identity of the air 
carriers and they cannot go beyond what is needed to attain the policy objectives.’62  
Hence, while PSOs could be utilized to lift barriers to the economic and social development 
of regions or cities, they must not be implemented with the aim, directly or indirectly, to 
develop a particular airport and neither to promote or support a particular air carrier. 
 
As can be seen though, it is viewed that Members States have a relatively large degree of 
freedom with respect to when a PSO service should be offered in the first place, and also with 
respect to the definition of a thin route.63 Consequently, this has invariably led to a certain 
degree of diversity in PSO practice and operations that inevitably leads to a fine line existing, 
between supporting areas and providing, a de factor, (State or Regional) aid, in most cases to 
a national airline, reasoned by presenting a rationale to justify the use of a PSO.   
 
This said, the EU Commission identifies that ‘the number of formal complaints – lodged by 
airlines and airports – has been very limited.’64  It also identifies and rationalizes that Article 
16(1) of the Regulation does in fact pose ‘limits to the margin of discretion of the Member 
States.’65  Conversely, the Commission has no power to require a Member State to impose a 
specific PSO on any route; while it does though, assess the criteria for those proposed in 
terms of adherence to the necessity and the adequacy provisions (as Article 16.3 above) of 
the envisaged PSO. 
 
Taking the two PSOs identified above, from Strasbourg to Amsterdam and Strasbourg to 
Munich, it would have to be questioned whether (i) both adequately fall within the non-
specific definition of a thin route and/or (ii) whether a PSO is justified, under the necessity 
 
59 Article 16(1) of Regulation No 1008/2008. ‘The airport’ here refers to the airport serving a peripheral or 
development region in the territory of the Member State.  
60 Svein Bråthen and Knut Sandberg Erikeson. Regional aviation and the PSO system – Level of Service and 
social efficiency. Journal of Air Transport Management. June 2018, Volume 69 Pages 248-256. 
61 This would have been based on data prior to the latest 2019 DG Move records – during the period when there 
were more PSOs – 179 of which 136 were subsidized.  
Commission Information Notice: INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, 
OFFICES AND AGENCIES: Interpretative guidelines on Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council — Public Service Obligations (PSO). June 17, 2017 O.J. C 194/01. 
62 Id. 
63 Svein Bråthen and Knut Sandberg Erikeson. Regional aviation and the PSO system – Level of Service and 
social efficiency. Journal of Air Transport Management. June 2018, Volume 69 Pages 248-256. 
64 Commission Information Notice: INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, 
OFFICES AND AGENCIES: Interpretative guidelines on Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council — Public Service Obligations (PSO). June 17, 2017 O.J. C 194/01 
65 Id. 
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and adequacy provision relating to access to other alternative transport modes and whether 
such can (or cannot) adequately meet the transport needs of the region concerned.  
 
The EU Commission refers to the need to take services offered by train, coach and, where 
necessary and applicable, ferry provisions, into account. Stating that, ‘the adequacy of the 
services should be assessed, in particular, with regard to their frequency, journey times, 
departure times and to possible connections to other important destinations, in particular 
long-haul travel options.’66  
 
The possibilities of individual (car) transport is also another factor that should also be 
explored, having regard in particular to the journey times by road. As previously said, access 
to Munich to Strasbourg is reasonably well catered for by both road and rail.   
 
This said, the EU Commission refers to a train journey of less than three hours in particular 
being taken into account, noting that (from Strasbourg) to Munich it is an extra 43 minutes 
(on average). However, it is also identified that each assessment should be based on a case-by 
case basis.  
 
In many cases, there is little doubting that identified routes are essential and are even deemed 
life-line services. In some instances, the use of PSOs forms the larger percentage of domestic 
traffic – for example, in Ireland the share of PSOs in the domestic traffic equates to 
approximately 70 %.67  
 
PSO routes to islands therefore, in most instances, are both necessary and justified. In many 
cases there are also seasonal justification in terms of fluctuating tourist demands, when, 
during certain periods, there is not enough traffic to support a commercially viable operation 
being applied on a year-round basis. Such routes exist for example in Estonia, Ireland, Italy, 
Greece, Portugal and the UK.  
 
While some Member States, such as Finland and Sweden, are less densely populated and 
there are cases where distances between regions are particularly long and where no 
alternative transport tends to exist. Such routes therefore can generally be eligible for the use 
of PSOs.  
 
As per the introduction to this paper, recognition is clearly accorded to the significance 
played by air transport services to individual EU citizens and business. The Communication 
on the ‘Aviation strategy for Europe’68 identified and acknowledged that access to high 
quality air transport services is essential to the EU internal market and hence, the very ethos 
as to why it was created.  
 
 
4. THE RIGHT TO …… Free Movement and Travel 
 
Technically, the principles enshrined into the European Treaties,69 that function as the 




67 Id.  
68 COM(2015) 598 final of December 12, 2015.  
69  Enshrined in the first European Treaty of Rome in 1957 (as discussed at Section 2 of this paper) 
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• Free movement of goods; 
• Free movement of capital; 
• Freedom to establish and provide services; 
• Free movement of persons. 
 
These freedoms have largely been guaranteed since the mid-1980’s which is also when 
significant advancement was made in terms of liberalization of the internal aviation market.70  
De facto, aviation became the first mode of transport — ‘and to a large extent still the only 
one — to benefit from a fully integrated single market.’71 
 
The original concept of free movement was to enable the European ‘working population’ to 
freely travel and settle in any EU State. In the mid 1980’s, cooperation between individual 
governments also led to the signing, in Schengen (Luxembourg), of the Agreement on the 
gradual abolition of checks at common borders,72 followed by the signing in 1990 of the 
Convention implementing that Agreement.73  
 
Since the 1990’s there has also been a drive to enforce the concept of European citizenship74 
and a sense of belonging to the European Union or, phrased another way, a Union of United 
Nations (States). In this way, it also serves as a mechanism to ensure unity, removing barriers 
(and borders) and, many other discriminatory/protectionist practices – creating equality 
regardless of race, or a perceived affiliation to (or ownership) by to a member state (through 
birth or a passport). This is, in essence, the same ethos as applied to a European or 
Community (aviation) carrier – which led to the realization of stand-alone cabotage across a 
united network of States/countries.75  
 
The free movement of persons therefore is a fundamental right guaranteed by the EU to its 
‘citizens.’ It enables every EU citizen to travel, work and live in any EU country with relative 
ease. In many ways the EU has taken the concept of Article 13 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Right (UDHR76) one step further; this stating that: 
“(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders 
of each state. 
(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to 
his country.”77 
 
70 As per discussions within Section 2 (2.1) of this paper. 
71 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/131/air-transport-market-rules 
72 The implementation of the Schengen Agreements started in 1995, initially involving seven EU States. 
73 Today, the Schengen Area encompasses most EU States, with the exception of Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, 
Ireland and Romania. However, Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania are currently in the process of joining the 
Schengen Area. Of non-EU States, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and Liechtenstein have joined the Schengen 
Area. 
Noting: the UK (even before its departure from the EU) was never part of the wider Schengen Agreement and 
related Protocols). 
74 The Treaty on European Union introduced for the first time a systematic concept of citizenship in the 
Community scope: Treaty on European Union 1992; (In Part Two of the EC Treaty; Articles 17 – 22 EC - 
renumbered after the Treaty of Amsterdam). Since the Lisbon Treaty: Part Two - NON-DISCRIMINATION 
AND CITIZENSHIP (Articles 18 – 25). 
75 See EU (External) Aviation Policy Briefing – May 2016. 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/582021/EPRS_BRI%282016%29582021_EN.pdf 
76 The Declaration was proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly in Paris on 10 December 1948. 
77 See linked discussions within: Sarah Jane Fox (2017) “Mobility and Movement Are ‘Our’ Fundamental 
Rights”. . . Safety & Security – Risk, Choice & Conflict! Issues in Aviation Law and Policy. Volume 17 No. 1. 
Autumn, 2017, pp 7-43.   
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Schengen cooperation therefore enhances this freedom by enabling citizens to cross internal 
borders without being subjected to regular/systematic border checks. There is a common set 
of Schengen rules applied (the so-called "Schengen acquis") that cover, controls of land, sea 
and air borders (airports), as well as the issuing of visas, police cooperation and protection of 
personal data. 
 
The border-free Schengen Area guarantees free movement to more than 400 million EU 
citizens (as well as to many non-EU nationals, businessmen, tourists or other persons legally 
present on the EU territory). This unfettered ability to move freely across sovereign states 
borders ultimately recognizes the importance of transport in our daily lives. Mankind has 
both a physiology and a psychological need for physical mobility.78 
 
The movement of people, goods and services invariably remains the lifeline of civilization.79 
As the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, acknowledged, “[t]ransport is 
vital for everyone.”80  
 
Noting, the word ‘vital’ is also used to provide rationale for the use of a PSO – reinforcing 
the concept of transport (in this context, air services) as an enabler of economic, social and 
cultural survival. The importance was also mentioned in the opening paragraphs of this paper 
in terms of the fact that mobility is vital to the ..... quality of life of citizens as they enjoy their 
freedom to travel....”81  
 
 
4.1. Covid-19: 2020 – The world is turned upside down! 
 
In 2020: Covid-19 turned the ‘the world upside down.’82 It has been described as an 
unprecedented global crisis, with countries worldwide facing agonizing health and social 
emergencies.83  
 
Cases of Covid-19 technically started to emerge in late 2019, when the virus was first 
reported in Wuhan, the Hubei province of China.  
 
Since this time, the “coronavirus” has spread across the world and, on February 11, 2020, the 
World Health Organization (WHO) stated the official name would be COVID-19, a 
shortened version of the coronavirus disease - 2019. The more formal name (as referred to by 
 
78 Id. Discussing Clifford R. Bragdon, Transportation Security. Butterworth-Heinemeann Homeland Security 
Series (2008). 
79 As discussed within a previous edition of this journal 
Sarah Jane Fox (2017) “Mobility and Movement Are ‘Our’ Fundamental Rights”. . . Safety & Security – Risk, 
Choice & Conflict! Issues in Aviation Law and Policy. Volume 17 No. 1. Autumn, 2017, pp 7-43 
80 Emphasis added to the word ‘vital.’ 
UN Press release. ‘New UN group seeks solutions for harnessing rising investments in transport while reducing 
harmful pollutants for sustainable future.’ New York, 18 November 2014.  
81 Emphasis added. COM (2011) 144 (final) ‘Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area – Towards a 
competitive and resource efficient transport system.’ Brussels, 28.3.2011.  
82 https://unstats.un.org/unsd/ccsa/documents/covid19-report-ccsa.pdf 
83 https://www.statista.com/statistics/1103040/cumulative-coronavirus-covid19-cases-number-worldwide-by-
day/ (August 7, 2020). 
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the International Committee on Taxonomy of Viruses) is SARS-CoV-2 “severe acute 
respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2.”84 
 
As of March 11, 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared COVID–19 as a 
pandemic85 - causing pandemonium globally.  
 
To date, the disease has impacted around 210 countries and territories, with the United States 
confirming circa one-quarter of all global cases.86  
 
August 2020 - since 31, December 2019 (and as of August 6, 2020) 18 793 522 cases of 
COVID-1987 have been reported, including 707 715 deaths worldwide.88 
Noting number supplied by WHO differ (as of August 8, 2020): they were reporting 13 146 
596 cases with 441 178 confirmed deaths.89  
This difference serves not only to demonstrate the consequence of this disease, but actually to 
highlight the sheer unknowns in terms of the actual magnitude – which will doubtless never 
be anywhere near fully accurately recorded.  
 
Europe – has seen 3 000 274 cases; with, 206 131 deaths. 
- The five countries reporting most cases are Russia (867 343), United Kingdom 
(307 184), Spain (305 767), Italy (248 803) and Germany (213 067).  
- The five countries reporting most deaths are United Kingdom (46 364), Italy (35 181), 
France (30 305), Spain (28 499) and Russia (14 532).90 
 
Many health systems have been overwhelmed worldwide, with the disease affecting the 
richest and poorest areas of society. With the steep rise in the number of global coronavirus 
cases countries have had to resort to drastic measures to try to lower the number of cases to 
minimize (and ideally prevent) the spread of the virus. In many countries national and 
regional ‘lockdowns’ have occurred, whereby citizens have been confined to their homes 
with a restriction to their movements to set times or events – including within the EU. 
 
This extraordinary measure goes against the concept of free movement and the right to 
travel.91 Yet, the severity of the disease has led to such unprecedented measures being taken – 
 
84 “The International Committee on Taxonomy of Viruses and the World Health Organization announced 
official names for both the virus and the disease it causes: SARS-CoV-2 and COVID-19, respectively.” 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/1043366/novel-coronavirus-2019ncov-cases-worldwide-by-country/ 
(The SARS-CoV–2 virus causes the disease COVID–19). 
85 WHO Director-General's opening remarks at the media briefing on COVID-19 March 11, 2020. 
https://www.who.int/dg/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-
covid-19---11-march-2020 
86 August 7, 2020 – data from: https://www.statista.com/statistics/1043366/novel-coronavirus-2019ncov-cases-
worldwide-by-country/ 
87  Data: In accordance with the applied case definitions and testing strategies in the affected countries. 
88 Data from European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control - An agency of the European Union 
https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/geographical-distribution-2019-ncov-cases (August 7, 2020). 
United States: (August 7, 2020) 
Reported cases - 4 823 891 
Deaths - 158 256 
89 Number of Coronavirus (COVID-19) Cases Worldwide as of August 6, 2020, by Country, Statista.com 
https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019 
90 Data from European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control - An agency of the European Union 
https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/geographical-distribution-2019-ncov-cases (August 7, 2020). 
91 Noting that measures are able to be taken and limitations imposed, based on considerations of public security, 
public policy and hence, public health grounds. 
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whereby, the priority is to keep people safe, healthy and ultimately alive. This has resulted in 
reduced transport services for land, sea and air modes – including those operated under PSOs. 
 
The Schengen Borders Code allows Member States to impose a temporary provision, which 
allows the reintroduction of border control measures at the internal borders in the event that a 
serious threat to public policy or internal security has been established.92 It is ultimately a 
decision that rests with that Member State, while the Commission may issue an opinion with 
regard to the necessity of the measure and its proportionality, it is unable to veto such a 
decision. 
 
The reintroduction of border controls must remain an exception and must respect the 
principle of proportionality. The scope and duration of such a ‘temporary’ reintroduction is 
imposed for a limited time and should be restricted to the bare minimum needed to respond to 
the threat in question. Ultimately, reintroducing border control at the internal border is used 
as a measure of last resort and hence this shows the severity of Covid-19 in 2020 when a 
number of States applied various forms of limitations of citizens movements within the EU.93 
This was particularly noticeable across the months of March and April, when, in March, EU 
Member States agreed on coordinated action at the external borders based on the 
recommendations by the Commission to restrict non-essential travel for a specific period 
which has since been extended a number of times.94  
 
By mid-April the EU Commission published a Roadmap aimed at reducing the measures 
imposed.95 In May this was reinforced with a publication addressing tourism and transport 
challenges in 2020 and beyond,96 and by June, 30 the EU Council adopted a 
Recommendation on the temporary restriction on non-essential travel into the EU and the 
possible lifting of such restriction.97  
 
 
5. COVID-19: Effects to aviation98 
 
This said, ‘transport’ has also been viewed as a key service - essential to keep moving, to 
ensure the supply of medical and other essential goods and is ultimately, a vital component to 
 
For example, the Free Movement Directive (2004/38/EC) provides the general principles applicable to 
restrictions and the grounds that may be used to justify such measures; these grounds are public policy, public 
security or public health. 
92 Public health is not explicitly mentioned in the legitimate grounds to reintroduce border checks:  
- Article 28 only refers to public policy and internal security. However, and even though EU law usually 
distinguishes public health from public policy, the latter can be broadly interpreted to cover the current 
circumstances and justify the measures taken. 
93 This link: provides an indicator of measures as of July, 13 2020: pursuant to Article 25 and 28 et seq. of the 
Schengen Borders Code: 
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-
visas/schengen/reintroduction-border-control/docs/ms_notifications_-_reintroduction_of_border_control_en.pdf  
94 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE 
EUROPEAN COUNCIL AND THE COUNCIL. 
COVID-19: Temporary Restriction on Non-Essential Travel to the EU. Brussels, March, 16, 2020 COM(2020) 
115 final.  
95 Joint European Roadmap towards lifting COVID-19 containment measures, OJ C 126, April 17, 2020 
96 Brussels, May 13, 2020 COM(2020) 550 final.  
97 Institutional File Reference No: 2020/0134  
98 Also see discussions by the author (currently in press): 
Sarah Jane Fox & Luis Martín Domingo, EU Air Passengers’ Rights Past, Present, and Future: In an Uncertain 
World (Regulation (EC) 261/2004: Evaluation and Case Study), 85 J. Air L. & Com. (September 2020). 
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our economy. While extraordinary measures at borders have been; and, are still being taken – 
from an EU perspective - guidelines were also provided for border management measures to 
protect health and ensure the availability of goods and essential services.99 This guidance 
document reiterated the need to recognize the concept of free movement (albeit, with 
limitations) to EU citizens and the obligations imposed on all States to, ‘admit their own 
citizens and residents, and facilitate transit of other EU citizens and residents that are 
returning home.’  
 
The guidelines also referred to the need to ensure ‘green lanes’ to facilitate the movement of 
freight, while a separate document was issued specifically relating to ensuring continuous air 
cargo.100 Within this, it was highlighted that restrictions on flights and/or limitations on the 
movement of passengers had been imposed, with a view to containing the pandemic, but it 
stressed the need for continued air cargo operations – identifying the importance of air 
freight, particularly for time-sensitive cargo during this crisis and in the direct fight against 
Covid-19. Mention was also made (referring to March consequences) that, air traffic 
movements were down over 80%, and nearly all passenger flights had been cancelled. 
Passenger services remain key to air freight movements, given that half of all air cargo is 
carried in the hold of passenger aircraft.101 This was largely due to the containment measures, 
such as travel restrictions and flight bans, imposed by States, as well as a significant drop in 
demand for travel.  
 
From a U.S. perspective; on March 17, 2020, the USA announced the decision of the 
Secretary of Homeland Security (DHS) to direct all flights to the United States carrying 
persons who have recently traveled from, (or were otherwise present within) the Schengen 
Area to arrive at one of the number of designated United States airports, where the was 
focusing public health resources.102  
 
As was commented upon in the introduction Covid-19 has led to the “deepest crisis ever in 
the history of aviation,”103 surpassing the tragedies’ of 9/11 and the predecessor of the  
 
99 Brussels, March 16, 2020 C(2020) 1753 final.  
100 Brussels, March 26, 2020 C(2020) 2010 final  
101 Id. 
102 Federal Register: Vol. 85, No. 52 - Tuesday, March 17, 2020 - Rules and Regulations (15059). 
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY. U.S. Customs and Border Protection 19 CFR Chapter I 
Transportation Security Administration 49 CFR Chapter XII  
Notification of Arrival Restrictions Applicable to Flights Carrying Persons Who Have Recently Traveled From 
or Were Otherwise Present Within the Countries of the Schengen Area. 
Pursuant to 19 U.S.C. 1433(c), 19 CFR 122.32, 49 U.S.C. 114, and 49 CFR 1544.305 and 1546.105, DHS has 
the authority to limit the locations where all flights entering the U.S. from abroad may land. 
(Noting: flights carrying cargo only were excluded from this. And, observing two days later, the same 
limitations were applied in respect to the UK and the Republic of Ireland). 
103 https://unstats.un.org/unsd/ccsa/documents/covid19-report-ccsa.pdf 
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Coronavirus/Covid-19104 – Sars-Cov (in 2002/3)105 with it being reported that the “depth of 
COVID19 impact far exceeds previous crises RPKs 20% fall after 9-11 and 12% after SARS 
vs 95% fall in April 2020.”106 This is consistent across the globe – it is a truly global crisis on 
a scale never previously experienced and, appreciating aviation has certainly had its fair share 










              1972/3107   1981/2108   1990/1109  1997-8110     2001111   2002/3112     2008/9113  2019/2021… 







Chart 1: Global events challenging aviation 
(1972-2020 and beyond) 
 
104 Both COVID-19 and SARS are caused by coronaviruses: 
• SARS-CoV, the virus that caused SARS, which first came to light in late 2002 being identified in 2003 
https://www.who.int/ith/diseases/sars/en/ 
https://www.biospace.com/article/comparison-2003-sars-pandemic-vs-2020-covid-19-pandemic/ ) 
• MERS-CoV, the virus that caused Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS), which was first 
identified in 2012. 
• SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, which was first identified in 2019. 
https://www.healthline.com/health/coronavirus-vs-sars#sars 
https://www.thelancet.com/journals/laninf/article/PIIS1473-3099(20)30129-8/fulltext 
105 Wall Street Journal - “Global Airlines Brace for Coronavirus Impact”– Early predictions said that ‘Epidemic 




107 The oil crisis spanned much of the 1970’s (https://www.history.com/topics/1970s/energy-crisis) 
108 Technically the war is recorded from 1980-1988 (https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/iran-
iraq.htm) 
109 Recorded as of Aug 2, 1990 – Feb 28, 1991 (https://www.history.com/topics/middle-east/persian-gulf-war) 
110 Again, spanning a period of years – normally accepted to be 1996-1998 (with 97/98 the peak of the crisis) 
https://unctad.org/en/Docs/ux_hi_akyuz.en.pdf 
111 9/11 refers to a series of four coordinated terrorist attacks by the Islamic terrorist group al-Qaeda against the 
United States on September 11, 2001 – although the effects were felt for a number of years and there were 
residual consequences (particularly to aviation security as a result of this specific day). 
112 Technically identified as spanning from 2002-2004 with a peak in 2003 
SARS coronavirus (SARS-CoV) a virus first identified in 2003, first infecting humans in the Guangdong 
province of southern China in 2002. https://www.who.int/ith/diseases/sars/en/ 
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(Authors – based on ICAO data114) 
 
On March 13, British Airways Chief Executive, Alex Cruz, stated, “It is a crisis of global 
proportions like no other we have known,” and will ultimately lead to the grounding of 
airlines on a scale never previously seen. In the video message sent to staff, he advised them, 
not to ‘underestimate the seriousness of this for our company;’ identifying that jobs would be 
lost. The headlined message said it all, ‘the survival of British Airways.’115 
 
As of mid-June, 2020, it was stated that airlines around the world, were predicted to lose a 
record $84 billion in 2020, more than three times the loss made during in the Global 
Financial Crisis.116 It was identified that the loss would continue into at least 2021, with an 
anticipated loss of circa $16 billion in 2021; that prediction being made with the assumption 
that there would not be a second wave of COVID-19 infections in the autumn and winter.117 
 
ICAO – reporting as of August 5, 2020 painted an even more negative picture, with the 
following estimates:118 
First Quarter 2020 – January-March 
• Overall reduction ranging from 18% to 37% of seats offered by airlines  
• Overall reduction of 290 to 562 million passengers  
• Approximately USD 44 to 80 billion potential loss of gross passenger operating 
revenues of airlines  
 
Full year 2020 (January-December)  
• Overall reduction ranging from 44% to 50% of seats offered by airlines  
• Overall reduction of 2,538 to 2,843 million passengers  
• Approximately USD 343 to 383 billion potential loss of gross passenger operating 
revenues of airlines.119  
 
ICAO clearly acknowledged the following (meaning it could actually be worse than 
anticipated and forecast): 
“The actual impacts will depend on duration and magnitude of the outbreak and 
containment measures, the degree of consumer confidence for air travel, and 
economic conditions, etc.”120  
 
The July 2020 Moody’s report (by the Investor Service) – stated: 
 
114 International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) data: 
https://www.icao.int/sustainability/Documents/COVID-19/ICAO_Coronavirus_Econ_Impact.pdf 
Dates refer to peak effects to aviation during the crises – accepting that there would also be some regional 
variations. 
115 As reported via Sky News (online) 
https://news.sky.com/story/coronavirus-more-serious-for-airline-industry-than-9-11-ba-boss-11957065 
116 The International Air Transport Association (IATA)   
https://www.iata.org/en/iata-repository/publications/economic-reports/record-loss-in-2020-extending-to-2021-
but-at-a-lower-level/ 
117 World Economic Forum (referring to IATA date) 
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/06/4-charts-airline-crisis-covid-way-ahead/ 
118 ICAO: Effects of Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19) on Civil Aviation: Economic Impact Analysis  
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“The global airline industry has been disproportionately affected by the coronavirus 
pandemic, and the strain on its once flourishing fundamentals will affect a broad 
swath of the world economy well into 2022 and beyond, given the importance of 
passenger airlines to global economic activity.”121 
 
In the same report, it was identified that the industry would not recovery to the 2019 demands 
until, at the earliest, 2023, however even in this regard there was caution since the infection 
rates rise and dip and then rise again.122 IATA, only a few weeks later, stated Global 
passenger traffic (revenue passenger kilometers or RPKs) would not return to pre-COVID-19 
levels until 2024, that is a year later than previously projected.123 Ultimately, Covid-19 has 
dramatic consequences to individual airlines (as well as airports and all players involved in 
the aviation industry) – including of course, passengers and the overall economies of nations. 
Hence, the recovery of the industry remains unknown and is subject to many factors, not just 
the containment of the virus but passenger confidence and the ability to be able purchase 
flights and holidays (i.e. public spending).  Many individuals have inevitably lost their jobs, 
as other industries also struggle to survive, which creates a circle in terms of less corporate 
demand for travel.    
 
From a European perspective, as of August 17, 2020, ICAO estimates that Europe’s lost 
revenue is approximately USD $57,934,897,437.124  IATA’s June data reveals that European 
carriers saw demand topple 96.7% in that month versus a year earlier, compared to a 98.7% 




5.1. Bailouts and support: A risk to liberalization and competition? 
 
The future for the aviation industry looks bleak, as viewed in 2020, and for some time to 
come. This affects not only the airlines but ‘would-be’ passengers as well. 
The opening statement of this paper – said: 
‘transport drives development, links people, connects local communities to the world, 
builds markets and facilitates trade.’126  It is key to our very survival. It is arguably a 
fundamental right to be able do so. 
 
 
121 Research Announcement: 
Moody's – Coronavirus-related disruptions to airline industry affect broad swath of global economy 




123 IATA Press Release No: 63. Dated: July 28, 2020 
Recovery Delayed as International Travel Remains Locked Down 
 https://www.iata.org/en/pressroom/pr/2020-07-28-02/ 
124 Int’l Civil Aviation Org., Revenue/Pax/Seat Losses, https://data.icao.int/coVID-19/economic.htm (last visited 
Aug. 17, 2020). 
125 Press Release, Int’l Air Transp. Ass’n, Recovery Delayed as International Travel Remains Locked Down 
(July 28, 2020), https://www.iata.org/en/pressroom/pr/2020-07-28-02/. 
126 MOBILIZING for DEVELOPMENT:  Analysis and Policy Recommendations from the United Nations 
Secretary-General's High-Level Advisory Group on Sustainable Transport. New York City, October 2016. 
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/2375Mobilizing%20Sustainable%20Transport.pdf 
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As a consequence, PSOs exist in order to ensure that commercial transport services, including 
aviation, are available to citizens.  In rural and peripheral regions, these are essential and vital 
services, normally applied so as to connect communities within one State and provide 
citizens with freedom and quality of life.  That said, it has also been argued127 that on some 
occasions, across borders, the utilization of PSOs is being applied in a questionable manner – 
with routes being designated as “thin” (or “development”) when arguably they are not and/or 
there is means to utilize other transport modes. 
Today, airlines are identifying the risk to their businesses in terms of being able to survive 
and provide any services at all in the future. 
Italy’s former flag carrier – Alitalia, even before Covid-19, was struggling for survival. Last 
year, the carrier was reported as losing more than €450 million and in the first quarter of this 
year another €218 million.128 Airline bosses are crying out for support from their respective 
governments and hence what amounts to State aid. 
 
In March, at the start of the Covid-19 crisis, the chairman Peter Norris the majority 
shareholder of the Virgin Group129 (supported by Shai Weiss, the Virgin Atlantic’s chief 
executive) is understood to have written to the prime minister to warn that the UK sector 
would need, at that time, immediate financial aid of between £5bn and £7.5bn.130 
This said, in July 2020, Virgin Atlantic was forced to seek support from the Virgin Group 
through the injection of £200m, with additional funds provided by investors and creditors. 
This included brokering a deal that included funding from US hedge fund Davidson Kempner 
Capital Management, plus, the postponement of about £450m in payments to creditors.131 In 
total it was recorded as a 1.2 billion pounds-deal. Even then, it is being questioned, if this will 
be enough to keep the airline going. Initially the airline had hoped that the UK government 
would bail them out with £500 million in loans, however, it was reported that ministers had 
made it clear, that taxpayers’ money (State aid) would only be considered once all other 
options had been exhausted.132 The potential is that this may yet occur.  
 
At the start of the crisis in March, 2020, – the UK regional carrier ‘Flybe133’ - the largest in 
Europe, lost its battle for survival, when it entered into administration. It had already received 
a State aid bail-out from the government in January of that year, which was heavily criticised 
by Willie Walsh, the then Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of IAG.134 Reportedly, Walsh had 
written to the transport secretary arguing that Flybe should not be bailed out by public purse-
strings, asserting that the airline's owners, which ironically included Virgin Atlantic/Delta 
should be digging deeper.  
 
 
127 See supra sec. 3.2.1 (case studies discussion). 
128 Euronews report: 
https://www.euronews.com/2020/05/22/analysis-can-the-aviation-industry-survive-the-coronavirus-crisis 
129 Virgin Group owns 51% of the airline, with the rest held by US carrier Delta Air Lines. 
130 Guardian news report: UK airlines call for multibillion bailout to survive Covid-19 crisis 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/15/uk-airlines-call-for-multibillion-bailout-to-survive-covid-19-
crisis 
131 BBC Report July 14, 2020: Coronavirus: Virgin Atlantic finalises £1.2bn rescue deal (online) 
https://www.bbc.com/news/business-53406604 
132 Id. 
133 Flybe was the biggest operator of UK domestic flights, carrying around eight million passengers annually 
and flying from 43 airports across Europe and 28 in Britain. 
https://news.cgtn.com/news/2020-03-05/UK-airline-Flybe-collapses-as-virus-hits-flights-worldwide-
OBJuJUAidi/index.html 
134 International Airlines Group.  
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Walsh is supposedly have written in his letter:  
“Prior to the acquisition of Flybe by the consortium, which includes Virgin/Delta, 
Flybe argued for taxpayers to fund its operations by subsidizing regional routes. 
Virgin/Delta now want the taxpayer to pick up the tab for their mismanagement of the 
airline. This is a blatant misuse of public funds.”135 
 
It is stated that Flybe’s deal provided the airline with three months to pay off around $130 
million worth of duty. The deal is also thought to have included also a plan to review this 
duty which is te £13 ($16) air passenger duty (APD) on domestic flights – often criticized by 
the airlines, particularly on internal flights within the same country.136  
 
This said, the government support package was also criticized by Caroline Lucas (a Green 
Party MP) who tweeted, “Domestic flights need to be reduced, not made cheaper.”137 A 
comment which offers more support to the environment than potentially recognizing the 
value and importance of regional connectivity (the ethos – enshrined within the PSO 
mechanism) to the community and hence, passengers. It is questionable whether any of the 
Flybe routes could have been considered and deemed by the UK government as a public 
obligation service (PSO). Flybe already having one PSO route from Newquay (Cornwall) 
into London Heathrow scheduled to operate from October 26, 2018 until October 25, 2022.138 
 
As the consequences of Covid-19 continue to be felt globally, many airlines (including 
European carriers) faced with an uncertain future, also continue, to look to their governments 
for support; with it being reported, for example: that Alitalia, now stands to be relaunched 
with a massive €3 billion injection of government subsidies.139 While the German airline 
‘Condor’ is also reported to receive a second round of public aid. The bail out to Condor 
having already come under scrutiny from the EU Commission who assessed the measure 
under Article 107(2)(b) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 
finding that:  
 
“This State-guaranteed €550 million loan will allow Germany to compensate Condor, 
operating in the particularly hard hit aviation sector, for part of the damage suffered 
due to the coronavirus outbreak. We cooperate with Member States to find workable 
solutions.”140  
 
In other words, the Commission found it compatible to provide State aid to compensate 
specific companies or specific sectors (in the form of schemes within the meaning of Article 
107(2)(b)) for damage(s) directly caused by exceptional occurrences – which, Covid-19 must 
be recognized by all to be. 
 





138 EU Commission State aid data. 
139 Euronews report: 
https://www.euronews.com/2020/05/22/analysis-can-the-aviation-industry-survive-the-coronavirus-crisis 
140 Emphasis added: EU Commission: State Aid Press Release: State aid: Commission approves €550 million 
German State-guaranteed loan to compensate airline Condor for damage caused by coronavirus outbreak 
Reported - April 27, 2020 
The non-confidential version of the decision will be/is available under the case number SA.56867 is available in 
the State Aid register. 
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This said, Ryanair’s CEO, Michael O’Leary has condemned the move and readiness to 
allocate State aid; with airlines being accused of being ‘State aid junkies.’141  
O’Leary rationalized,  
“What's clearly happening is we have the French and the Germans creating a huge 
fund - billions in state aid - that will allow them to either low-cost sell against the 
likes of Ryanair during the recovery period or allow them to engage in mergers and 
acquisitions and buy up all their weaker competitors when this is over.” 142 
 
There is little doubt that this will be the case, whereby there will be inequality across the EU 
(and UK/Ireland) in terms of which governments will support their States airlines and to what 
amount. This said, the EU Commission has shown that (as above) it is eager to cooperate 
with Member States to find workable solutions.”143 Latvia’s airBaltic, which reportedly lost 
€8.2 million in 2019, was also identified to receive ‘a large infusion of government funds.’144 
This also having now been reviewed by the EU Commission and considered not to breach 
State aid145; or, more, specifically be compatible under the new State aid temporary 
framework – which looks at allowing more State intervention, or more precisely State aid 
measures to support the economy in the current COVID-19 outbreak.146 
 
As was said by Executive Vice-President Margrethe Vestager, in charge of the competition 
policy, justified:  
“AirBaltic plays a key role for the Latvian economy. It contributes to foreign trade 
and to ensuring Latvia's domestic and international connectivity. The crisis has hit 
this airline, as many other companies in the aviation sector, particularly hard. The 
€250 million Latvian recapitalisation measure will help airBaltic weather the crisis. 
At the same time, the measure ensures that the State is sufficiently remunerated for 
the risk taxpayers assume, and that the support comes with strings attached, including 
a dividend ban as well as further measures to limit distortions of competition…..”147  
 
AirBaltic is the largest airline in Latvia. Its main shareholder is the Latvian State, which 
currently holds a share of around 80%. After the recapitalisation, carried out in July 2020, the 
participation of the State will increase to above 96%.148 
 
5.1.1. Implications to PSOs 
There is arguably a fine line between supporting communities – more specifically, defining 
communities that need support and providing funding to airlines to deliver subsidized 
 
141 As stated within the Euronews report 
https://www.euronews.com/2020/05/22/analysis-can-the-aviation-industry-survive-the-coronavirus-crisis 
142 Id. 
143 EU Commission: State Aid Press Release: State aid: Commission approves €550 million German State-
guaranteed loan to compensate airline Condor for damage caused by coronavirus outbreak 
Reported - April 27, 2020 
The non-confidential version of the decision will be/is available under the case number SA.56867 is available in 
the (EU) State Aid register. 
144 Euronews report: 
https://www.euronews.com/2020/05/22/analysis-can-the-aviation-industry-survive-the-coronavirus-crisis: 
145 EU State Aid Register - case number SA.56943. 
146 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION Temporary Framework for State aid measures to support 
the economy in the current COVID-19 outbreak. 
C/2020/1863. OJ C 91I, March 20, 2020, p. 1–9 
147 Emphasis added: EU State Aid Register - case number SA.56943 
148 Id. 
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transport services for such communities/locations, under the auspices of a PSO route (i.e. that 
do not breach State aid requirements). The use of the terms ‘peripheral’ and ‘development’ 
regions and a ‘thin route’ have certainly not been precisely defined.  Technically, public 
service compensation granted to airlines, under the execution of SGEI, can either be qualified 
as (i) no aid, (ii) State aid exempted from notification to the Commission or (iii) State aid to 
be notified to the Commission.  
 
There can be no denying that in a Covid-19 environment (and post Covid-19 world) many 
regions and States will experience a lower GDP per capita and a higher unemployment rate as 
a result of the pandemic, and, will, invariably, need to be supported by subsidized services; 
while, airlines will also need to receive financial aid to stay in business and, hence be 
positioned to service the need of all passengers that wish to fly, including those routes being 
operated under a PSO. 
 
On May 14, 2020, the European Commission published a working paper on the interpretation 
of State aid and public service obligations in the aviation sector in the context of the Covid-
19 crisis.149 It was clearly acknowledged, within, that the aim remains to ‘safeguard and 
restore the connectivity underpinning the free movement of people and goods’ per se, while 
being mindful of the need to maintain a ‘competitive internal market’…. which was 
described as the ‘best asset to bounce back strongly,’ after the crisis.150 
 
It is unknown as to the full consequences to the routes served by PSOs in terms of ensuring 
the continuous supply of the designated services (as contracted) but it highly likely that 
disruptions have occurred during this pandemic. The ASR explicitly provides for a special 
procedure in case of a sudden interruption of a service by an air carrier previously selected; 
however, this has limitations and it is almost certain that the drafters would never had 
envisaged a crisis as presented by Covid-19.151 So much so that, the exceptional 
circumstances arising out of the pandemic has led to new interpretive guidance being given 
as to how the four Altmark criteria could be fulfilled.152  
 
The emphasis evidently remains on protecting and restoring connectivity for all European 
citizens and businesses. While, it is clearly acknowledged that intervention will be needed, 
 
149 EU Working Paper: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/what_is_new/air_transport_overview_sa_rules_during_coronavirus.p
df 
This document had a disclaimer acknowledging that it was published 
‘…… without prejudice to the interpretation of the Treaty provisions on State aid by the Union Courts.’ The 
Working Paper saw two services, (i) Directorate-General for Competition (DG COMP) and (ii) the Directorate-
General for Transport and Mobility (DG MOVE) working closely together so as to provide further guidance.  
150 Id. (Emphasis added.) 
151 In accordance with Article 17 of that Regulation, and as applied on a specific PSO route.  
Article 16(12) of Regulation 1008/2008 entitles the Member State, in case of an emergency, to select by mutual 
agreement a different air carrier to operate that PSO route, for a temporary period of up to seven months – 
however this is not renewable.  
152 As explained within: 
EU Working Paper: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/what_is_new/air_transport_overview_sa_rules_during_coronavirus.p
df 
It is up to the Member States to self-assess whether the planned measure would comply with the Altmark 
conditions, and, thus, not constitute aid.  
See also the Communication from the Commission Guidance from the European Commission on using the 
public procurement framework in the emergency situation related to the COVID-19 crisis 2020/C 108 
I/01C/2020/2078. OJ C 108I , 1.4.2020, p. 1–5. 
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caution is given to methods which will or may lead to ‘undue distortions’ of competition, 
both during and after the crisis.153 The use of the word undue implies (much in the same way 
as limit is used154) that it is inevitable that distortions will occur but it is said that mechanisms 
that cause this should not be excessive, and/or be used in a discriminatory way. Clearly there 
remains a need to preserve an ‘efficient transport ecosystems.’155 However, in many ways, 
under a PSO route, services operated, arguably, cause a modicum of market distortion - as 
such routes cannot be run competitively and they are not, unsurprisingly, the most efficient of 
services. Their purpose is to be an enabler of growth and to ensure that citizens have the 
freedom of movement as provided by the particular mode of transport employed. In a post 
Covid-19 world this will be more crucial than ever and is likely to be needed by more citizens 
and regions. 
 
Member States are evidently encouraged to design their intervention measures on a non-
discriminatory basis and in a way which ‘preserves the pre-crisis market structures.’156 
However, this may prove a difficult task to achieve. It is acknowledged that any measures 
should pave the way for a ‘speedy economic recovery;157’ but, it is also conversely 
recognized, that any reduction in the number of economic actors in the internal market, post-
crisis, potentially would also negatively impact the market. Hence a reduction of players in 
the air transport sector could result in negative risk and consequences in terms of 






The historic developments of aviation and the alignment to the principle of creating one 
internal market within Europe was discussed earlier in this paper.158 It was identified, that 
individual governments, for a number of years, had continued to apply a legacy approach to 
protecting their own airlines handing out State aid which went against the policy direction for 
one internal, single market, causing higher fares, and hence, market distortion.159  It was 
invariably a practice that the EU was forced to intervene in. 
 
The consequences of Covid-19, certainly, in the short term at least, will create a similar 
environment – which does not necessarily see survival of the fittest airline - more like 
survival of those that are bailed out (in most cases) by their own State (or, States affiliated to 
the airline group). But arguably, this time, it will be a permissible measure to be taken – 
sanctioned in part, albeit temporarily, by the EU through the relaxation of State aid rule and 
the new (temporary) framework. 
 
 
153 EU Working Paper: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/what_is_new/air_transport_overview_sa_rules_during_coronavirus.p
df 
154 As above, in respect to the comments by Executive Vice-President Margrethe Vestager discussing AirBaltic 
(EU State Aid Register - case number SA.56943) 
155 EU Working Paper: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/what_is_new/air_transport_overview_sa_rules_during_coronavirus.
pdf 
156 Id. (Emphasis added.) 
157 Id. 
158 As at 2.1.1. Historic Challenges – affects to aviation: The internal dimension 
159 Id. 
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This said, airlines are in trouble and with this comes the risk to economies and the risk to our 
freedoms – whereby, we have less opportunity to travel (certainly by air) internationally, 
regionally and nationally. If airlines are not supported – our freedoms are ultimately 
compromised. Many airlines providing PSOs are also at risk however – in the same way as 
Flybe once was. Alitalia, for example, plays a vital role in terms of operating a large number 
of the Italian PSO routes, over half of the eleven routes.  
 
PSOs are recognized as playing a significant positive role in terms of not only connectivity 
but productivity – with studies showing that connectivity is vital for EU regions: ‘a 10 % 
increase of connectivity, as measured in those studies, stimulates the GDP (per capita) by an 
additional 0,5 %, the GDP growth rate by 1% and leads to an overall increase of labour 
productivity.’160 In other words, connectivity is key for growth, jobs and social cohesion. 
 
The EU’s cooperative approach to working with Member States (as evidenced through the 
Temporary Framework for State Aid Measures) shows more leniency to support not just the 
airlines, but State economies.  This is arguably an essential move – one that is unprecedented 
and shows the enormity of the Covid-19 crisis and the consequences to the entire European 
Union.  However, debatably, there will develop an even finer line in terms of the 
compatibility of PSOs and State aid support.  There is a potential risk to the liberalized and 
competitive system that now exists, which will need to be carefully monitored, so as not to 
return to State protectionism leading to market distortion (and restarting the circular journey 
that began at section 1.1 of this paper).  In the short term, though, connectivity is more 
essential. 
Connectivity remains vital and, in this respect, there is an obligation for States to provide 
transport links to its citizens, including by air.  Internally (within a State), remote and 
peripheral areas will, more than ever, need support from a social and commercial perspective.  
However, looking ahead, there potentially will be a need for more PSOs – on what were once 
buoyant commercial routes.  This could invariably result in “thin and development” routes 
being legitimately recognized and established – not only within a State but across borders.161  
States may need to establish (or choose) PSOs in order to give this needed connectivity and 






160 InterVISTAS (2015) Economic Impact of European Airports – A Critical Catalyst to Economic Growth; 
PwC, 2013, Econometric analysis to develop evidence on the links between aviation and the economy;  
IATA (2007) Aviation Economic Benefits - Measuring the economic rate of return on investment in the aviation 
industry.  
(As referred to in the Commission Information Notice: INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION 
INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES: Interpretative guidelines on Regulation (EC) No 
1008/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council — Public Service Obligations (PSO). June 17, 2017 
O.J. C 194/01). 
161 See supra sec. 3.2.1 (case studies section) (Note particularly the French PSOs – Strasbourg to Amsterdam 
and Strasbourg to Munich – for which the author raises some “legitimacy” questions in terms of their being fully 
compatible with the aims/objectives of a PSO route.). 
